Friday 11 December 2009

Proportional Procrastination

After a quiet period since the issue was last raised in the mid-90s, recently more pressure has been placed on Britain to reform the Westminster model of 'first-past-the-post' (FPTP) or simple majority voting. Even the Jenkins Report concluded that some form of reform was preferable, even if his recommendation was 85% Alternative Vote with additional top-up from a closed list, possibly one of the weakest reforms which could be made. Despite this, the Labour Party, contrary to its manifesto commitments, has chosen not to implement any electoral reform of this sort. So, with a general election looming and the possibility of a hung parliament being raised once again, this begs the question: what is it about Proportional Representation (PR) that those with the power to reform the system dislike?

The advantages of PR are well known: a system whereby the size of an interest group has a proportional amount of political weight in parliament, the avoidance of 'wasted' votes, both from candidates with too few votes and members with surplus votes and the tendency to provide a legislature which is more reflective of ethnic and gender diversity.

An issue which is seen as an advantage or a disadvantage based on individual viewpoint is the nature of candidates under PR: they are often 'consensus' candidates, proposed by the party in order to have the broadest possible appeal to the electorate. This tends to result in more moderate or centrist candidates being selected over radicals or ideologically driven candidates. This is also true of governments: under PR, usually no single party wins enough of the vote to form a government and a coalition is thus sought. However, despite the negative connotations which British and American commentators usually display at the mention of coalition government, we should not automatically reject the ideas of consensus and compromise as abhorrent.

As far as I can surmise, there are three usual complaints against PR: that the lack of constituencies creates only a weak link between voters and representatives, that this system both requires parties and rewards larger parties and finally, that it confers too much power on the high-ranking members of the party. A final '4th complaint' is the 'turkies voting for Christmas' argument: a party which has won an election by FPTP and formed government, without the need for coalition, has no reason to change the system.

Now, for the first argument, as Jenkins suggests, the solution seems to lie in having a seperate 'Additional Top-up' list. However, this should be an 'open list' where individual candidates can be selected. Each voter would then be able to select a local candidate by either Single Transferable Vote (STV) or perhaps range voting. Then the voter would select a party and choose a candidate from the party list.

This system definitely requires and promotes parties, but in terms of realpolitik, it seems fair to suggest that people will always organise and gather into groups based on beliefs. This system may presuppose this, but this can be viewed as an advantage in that a voter then gets to select two candidates who agree broadly with their views, thanks to the open list. One candidate to represent the voter directly and another to argue the voters beliefs firmly in parliament, without the encumberment of constituency work.

If thinking of constituency work as an encumberment seems reprehensible, then this leads to the third point: the power of party HQ. Under this system, there would need to be state-imposed restraints and limits on the power of party whips to impose upon constituency MPs. And instead of the top-up list being selected by party HQ, it could be created by petition, where any member who can raise 100 party signatures or 0.05% of the party, will be included on the list.
I feel that all of the theoretical problems with PR can be solved with the use of this Additional Member System and some lateral thinking. And if it all seems so much more complicated than crossing a box, then I don't think we should underestimate the intelligence of the average British voter, after all, the Irish and Germans have systems which are almost as complicated and have been shown to work remarkably well. There are many points i haven't the space to cover here, but i will try to answer them in the comments if raised.

Perfekt.

3 comments:

  1. Why should voters have to select a party?

    Also, are you aware that there is a proportional form of Score Voting that uses reweightings?
    http://scorevoting.net/RRV.html

    Asset voting is also cool.
    http://scorevoting.net/Asset.html

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  2. Perhaps unfortunately, i believe that in any society, groups of like-minded people will organise into 'parties'. Provided these associations are about mutual support and similar views on issues, its not a problem. The problem arrises when a 'party HQ' takes control of the top of the party apparatus and can then dictate policy and select lists. A constitutional ban on whips punishing those who do not toe the party line and a petition system among grassroots members to decide who appears on members seems to solve these problems, while assuring proportionality, and not sacrificing a direct link with voters.

    I agree with your comment on asset voting: it is cool. But it seems to me to be attempting to make post-electoral coalition deals into part of the electoral process itself.

    I like RRV in the sense that it satisfies monoticity (but fails participation). Indeed it is probably what i was getting at when i suggested 'STV or range voting'. The trouble with RRV in the system i propose is the sheer number of open-list candidates. On any given party list there would be perhaps 300 candidates, and ranking them all in order would be a futile exercise. I am fully in favour of RRV for the constituency voting however. With wasted votes added to the total number of party votes perhaps?

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  3. Let us not forget, only 2 British general election results in the entire 20th century would have been different with PR - both of which would have resulted in a hung parliament. Why make a change that won't result in a change? Nice article though!

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